Docs: audit fix batch plan (sync login, scoped restart, per-IP budget, login CSRF, pinned deps)
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# Code-audit fix batch (2026-09)
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Findings from the 2026-09-15 code audit, in shipping order. The systemd
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cutover was explicitly deferred — the process stays on run.sh's nohup
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model; only the restart mechanism's blast radius is fixed here.
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## 1. login handler blocks the event loop (HIGH)
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`login` is `async def`, so the anti-brute-force `time.sleep(0.5)` inside
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the lockout check runs ON the event loop: every wrong password stalls
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every in-flight request (all streams included) on the single worker.
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Fix: make the handler a plain `def` (uvicorn runs it on the threadpool);
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move the lockout logic into a side-effect-free `server/auth.py` so it is
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unit-testable without booting the app. Regression test measures
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`/api/cdn` latency while a wrong-password login is mid-sleep.
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## 2. run.sh global pkill (HIGH)
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`pkill -f "uvicorn .*app:app"` also matches the test server
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(`uvicorn server.app:app --host 127.0.0.1 --port 8399`): an ani-web
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restart kills running test sessions (and vice versa). Fix: PID file
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(`server.pid`) becomes the primary kill path; any pattern fallback is
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port-scoped to the real instance.
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## 3. lockout is per-username only (MEDIUM)
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Spreading failures across usernames bypasses the per-username lockout
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entirely (and anyone can lock a known account for 15 min). Add a
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per-IP failure budget (`ANIWEB_IP_FAILS` / window) on top of the
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per-username lockout. Client IP = `request.client.host`; the reverse
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proxy's `X-Forwarded-For` is consulted only when `ANIWEB_TRUST_XFF=1`
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(set by run.sh), so a spoofed header can't widen or narrow the gate.
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## 4. login is exempt from the CSRF header check (MEDIUM)
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The custom-header check that makes cross-site form POSTs fail excludes
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`/login`. The exemption is load-bearing only by accident (JSON body
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content-type); login becomes covered by the same check as every other
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mutation, and login.html sends the header.
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## 5. dependencies unpinned (MEDIUM)
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`curl_cffi` version churn = impersonation churn = silent upstream 403
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waves. requirements.txt becomes a full freeze; bump deliberately.
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